[edit] Korea in Retrospect
The war in Korea was an incident unique in modern history
and in the history of Canada, and it is worthwhile, even at this
early date, to try to assess while, even at this early date, to
try to assess its military and political significance.
The United Nations operations in Korea ended in a long
military deadlock followed by an armistice which did not
represent a clear victory for either side. This produced a
wide-spread feeling in the western countries that the whole
episode was a discouraging failure. This was particularly the
case perhaps in the United States, which had borne so much of the
brunt of the fighting and had suffered so heavily. Nevertheless,
seen in perspective, the Korean campaigns deserve to be
considered in many respects a hopeful rather than a melancholy
incident in international affairs.
In Korea the United Nations met a challenge and defeated it.
The Communist attack on South Korea in June 1950 was an act of
aggression, a local hot incident in the Cold War, which could not
have been over-looked without risking the gravest consequences
for the United Nations, the security of the western countries and
the peace of the world. As it was, the United Nations, under the
leadership of the United States, rallied to meet the threat with
a degree of unity and effective organization which marks a
turning-point in recent history. For the first time, an
international force took the field under the flag of the United
Nations. The forces of seventeen nations,* operating under a
unified command, defeated the Communist attempt to overrun South
Korea and saved that country's independence.
There can be no doubt that this result administered a severe
shock to the leaders of international communism; and it may have
made a considerable contribution to prompting them to adopt the
more conciliatory attitude which has occasionally appeared in
recent months. In June 1955 Mr. L. B. Pearson, the Canadian
Secretary of State for External Affairs, speaking on a television
broadcast marking the tenth anniversary of the United Nations,
was asked what he considered the greatest single achievement of
the Security Council and of the United Nations itself. He
replied that the most important single achievement, certainly the
most dramatic achievement, had been the organization's action in
Korea. "It meant for the first time," he said, "the defeat of
aggression by the armed conscience of the world."
- These include the Republic of Korea (though not a member
of the U.N.); but they do not include the five countries which
provided medical units only.
On the whole, the command arrangements for the heterogeneous
international force that fought under the blue and white United
Nations flag in Korea worked extremely well. All coalition wars
involve some difficulties, and this one was no exception. No
doubt the arrangements for control could in some respects have
been improved. In the same broadcast just quoted, Mr. Pearson
said: "I think we have learned something from this campaign.
There might well have been greater United Nations control of it -
especially control of political strategy. But that, however, I
think it is fair to say, would have required greater
participation by more United Nations members. You cannot have
collective control without genuine collective responsibility and
collective participation. And, as it happened, in the Korean
campaign the major part of the participation was borne by one
country, the United States." The actual majority of the member
countries of the U.N. made no contribution to the force; notably,
of the large group of Latin American republics only one B
Colombia - sent troops to Korea.
On the military side, the complaint was frequently heard,
particularly from U.S. officers, that the United Nations forces
had to fight the war under unnatural and artificial conditions.
In particular, the Communists were able to use the territory of
China beyond the Yalu River as a base, while our air forces were
not permitted to strike at this area. This was certainly a
considerable disadvantage to the U.N. forces. The limitation,
however, was imposed by the political authorities for political
reasons of the most compelling sort: the enormous importance of
preventing the limited and local conflict in Korea from widening
into a third world war. To have unleashed the air forces at the
cost of bringing on such a war would have been poor policy
indeed.
The United Nations troops found themselves facing formidable
antagonists. The North Koreans gave the small U.S. forces a bad
time in the early days; and the Chinese, who dominated the
picture in the later phases, showed themselves courageous and
resolute infantrymen. They were also vastly industrious,
particularly as diggers; and their deep defences were extremely
difficult to deal with.
Many westerners had undoubtedly assumed that the superior
equipment and science of western armies would soon defeat Chinese
and North Korean troops, however numerous. It was a shock to
discover that this was not the case. The Chinese divisions were
not so well equipped as our own. The enemy was never as strong
as we were in artillery; he used very little armour; he was
deficient in air support; and the Allied forces completely
controlled the seas. Nevertheless, in the face of the great
Chinese superiority in manpower, and the determination with which
it was employed, the United Nations forces were able to achieve
nothing better than a stalemate. The experience is worthy of
note.
Equally significant is the fact that the Korean campaigns
present us with an example of a war fought in the atomic age, yet
fought with conventional weapons and, basically, by the Army.
The United Nations could have used atomic weapons; there were
even some demands that they should do so; but they did not,
chiefly, undoubtedly, because the controlling governments
considered that the use of such weapons might extend the war.
And it is worth observing that it was Army forces, in the main,
that checked the aggressors. Air support was close, constant and
invaluable; the campaign could not have been carried on at all
without the navies; but the fighting was mostly done by soldiers,
using the weapons of the Second World War or their more modern
equivalents. The great need of the United Nations Command was
for fighting soldiers; it was for them that it called upon the
participating countries. The actual fighting done by Canadians
was almost all done by the Army, as the casualty figures amply
show.
These are matters of importance. There is no assurance,
unfortunately, that the Korean war was the last, or that the next
war, if there is one, will not be another "peripheral" and local
conflict of the same sort, rather than a worldwide struggle
fought with devastating nuclear weapons. Indeed, the former type
of war is very much more probable, just because a nuclear war
would probably mean a world conflict and virtually world suicide.
It was fortunate for the western nations that in 1950 they were
in possession of the weapons to fight such a peripheral war, and
not in a position where they could fight only with weapons which
were likely to start a world war. As for Canada, thanks to her
possessing forces and weapons suitable for intervention in Korea,
she was able to make a contribution to the defence of the West,
and in consequence has since been able to make her voice heard in
the international discussions and settlements arising out of the
Korean crisis.
As an episode in Canadian history, the war in Korea will
have some importance. Except for the South African campaigns of
1899-1902 and the part played by Canadian voyageurs in the Nile
Expedition of 1884-85, Canada's overseas wars have been fought in
Europe, and in the main in North-West Europe, an area with which
Canadians for many reasons have special connections. Apart from
the defence of Hong Kong in 1941, in which two Canadian
battalions took part, the fighting in Korea is the only Asiatic
campaign in which Canadian troops have served.
The Korean war was not a major conflict, and the Canadian
effort in it was in no sense parallel to that of the two World
Wars. It was nevertheless considerable, and Canada made a larger
contribution in proportion to her population than most of the
nations which provided troops for the international force. It is
worth remembering that on this basis a brigade group from Canada
was almost equivalent to four of the divisions sent to Korea by
the United States, which in 1950 had eleven times Canada's
population. And the quality of the contribution was excellent,
as the Canadian troops' record in action testifies.
The Korean war is also an episode of some significance in
the military history of the Commonwealth. The 1st Commonwealth
Division was a unique formation. Although soldiers from various
parts of the Commonwealth have long been accustomed to
co-operating closely with one another, such a composite division
had never been formed before. The experiment was triumphantly
successful, but this did not surprise people who were acquainted
with the history of the First and Second World Wars. The manner
in which the Canadian Corps of 1915-18, and the First Canadian
Army of 1942-45, operated as parts of British higher formations
had set precedents, and established habits and patterns of cooperation,
which were followed with excellent results in Korea.
Finally, it is right that we should turn our eyes once more
to the cause that brought Canadian soldiers across the Pacific to
fight and die among the mountains and rice paddies of Korea. In
the days before 1939 Canada, like many other countries, attempted
to isolate herself from world affairs in the hope that she could
remain safe and untouched, no matter what might happen to "less
happier lands" in Europe and Asia. The Second World War
convinced Canadians that such ideas were illusions; and since
1945 Canada has committed herself to a policy of "collective
defence"-of readiness to make political and military commitments
in the interest of maintaining international peace and security.
These commitments are expressed primarily in the United Nations
Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty.
In 1950 the country was called upon to honour her
obligations under the Charter, and the soldiers who went to Korea
were the means by which she honoured them. The international
force in which they served inflicted a check upon aggression
which had world-wide consequences. One may hope that it will do
something for the peace and security of generations yet unborn.
The Canadians who fell in Korea gave their lives in one of the
best causes for which men have ever sacrificed themselves. If,
as the old Roman said, it is sweet and fitting to die for one's
country, it is certainly no less fitting to die for the future of
mankind.
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