Canada's Army in Korea

Canada's Army in Korea Preface The First Canadians in Korea Background of the Conflict Formation of the CASF The Fighting in 1950 Canadian Troops in Action Political Aspects The Patricias at Kapyong Training at Fort Lewis The 25th Brigade Goes In Early RCN Operations The 25th Brigade in Action, 1951 The 2nd RCR at Chail-li Political Developments During June 1951 Canadian Operations During June and July Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division Across the Imjin The "Rotation" of Canadian Troops Enemy Attacks During November The Political Front, July-December 1951 Holding the Line, 1951-1953 The First General Rotation Patrols Against the Boot and Hill 113 Canadian Troops on Koje Island The RCR on Hill 355 The Patricias' Second Rotation Winter on the Hook Korean Personnel with the Canadian Forces The Second General Rotation The End of the Fighting The Attack on the 3rd RCR Political Developments, 1952-53 Administration Behind the Canadian Brigade, Juny 1951-July 1953 Supporting Arms Air Support and Supply The RCN in Korean Waters, May 1951-July 1953 The Toll of the War Conclusion Main Provisions of the Armistice Agreement The Canadians After the Armistice Canadian Troops Withdraw Korea in Retrospect Books and Articles for Further Reading Abbreviations

[edit] Patrols Against the Boot and Hill 113

In the middle of May the 1st Corps began to dispatch strong fighting patrols - one from every forward battalion each week - in order to snatch prisoners.

The 1st Patricias sent out such a patrol to an enemy-held hill known as "the Boot" on the night of the 20th-21st. The party consisted of one officer and 32 men, including two snipers, two wireless operators and two pioneers, and was divided into a firm base group, a covering fire section and a fighting section; the last-named was made up of a headquarters, two Sten groups and two Bren groups. Supporting fire was provided by a troop of the Strathconas, a troop of the 1st Regiment RCHA, and the unit mortar and machine-gun platoons. The firm base group established itself on the floor of the Nabu-ri valley at eleven o'clock, the main body passing through at midnight. Reaching the base of the hill without interference, the covering fire section took up a position some 50 yards below the enemy's trenches, while the remainder continued on up the slope. But now, as the party came within 20 yards of his main position, the enemy opened fire with every platoon weapon. Five of the Patricias were wounded, one of whom later died; among the other four was the patrol leader, Lieut. D. A. Middleton.

His group outnumbered three to one in immediate fighting strength, Lieut. Middleton ordered a withdrawal. The second-in-command, Corporal J. G. Dunbar, supervised the recovery of casualties, and it was only at the last moment that he realized that the officer was wounded. Lieut. Middleton, anxious not to hamper the withdrawal, urged the NCO to leave him behind; but Corporal Dunbar insisted on carrying him to safety. At one point, exhausted, he laid the Officer down and called on another member of the patrol for assistance, whereupon that soldier picked Dunbar up and carried him some distance before the corporal could persuade him that he had the wrong man! In due course the party arrived back with all its wounded. Enemy losses indicted by the patrol were estimated at seven wounded or killed. Unfortunately such patrols as this, in their very aggressiveness and frequency, failed in their primary purpose; for as the enemy learned to anticipate our actions it became more difficult to take him alive. Perhaps the most nearly successful of these patrols was one dispatched by the RCR on 31 May. This party, 23 strong, was made up of two assault sections and a firm base group. Directly in charge of one section was the patrol leader, Lieut. A. A. S. Peterson, the other two groups being commanded by NCOs. Weapons included six Brens (two in each group), machine-carbines, grenades, and a 2-inch mortar in the firm base. The objective was Point 113, some 500 yards north-east of the point at which the raiders were to cross the Nabu-ri stream. The patrol's entering the valley, at about 8:30 in the evening, was coordinated with an air strike on the objective. On reaching the base of the hill, Lieut. Peterson called down prearranged artillery fire on the upper slopes, then led his men to the first of three lines of trenches. Finding no enemy here, he set up his firm base and moved on to the next line, his own section in the lead. The artillery fire was stopped before the raiders arrived dangerously close to it, further support being provided by tanks, whose direct fire enabled them to "shoot in" the patrol almost all the way to its final objective. The intermediate line of trenches also was unmanned, the defenders having taken to their bunkers. While the second section began to search the position, Peterson's group pressed on to the top of the hill.

The whole feature proved to be held by a reinforced platoon. The enemy in the uppermost position came out fighting, and those in the bunkers halfway down the hill were now giving battle to the patrol's second section. One Chinese surrendered, but later made a dash for freedom which cost him his life; four others were killed and as many more apparently wounded. The patrol managed to bring back all its own casualties - four wounded - and all its weapons, as well as much new knowledge of the enemy's defences. Other actions of this series were similarly eventful, and all were a severe test of the soldier's courage, skill and resourcefulness; though none of the patrols succeeded in bringing back a live enemy prisoner. Between the 20th and the 24th the Patricias sent out a platoon size patrol to Point 133, the RCR staged a company raid on 113, and the Royal 22e dispatched a patrol more than 40 strong to the "Sami-chon feature". None of these actions was successful, and the cost was high-52 casualties, of which nine were fatal. A novel aspect of the third operation was that the raiders wore body armour, partially splinter-proof vests provided on loan by the 1st U.S. Marine Division.

In May the Canadian Brigade carried out more than 480 patrols of all types-419 standing, 43 ambush, 20 fighting and two reconnaissance-and during June almost 55O. Casualties for the period totalled 21 killed, 109 wounded and one taken prisoner. Not all these losses occurred in patrol actions: a number resulted from the enemy's artillery fire, which was becoming heavier and more effective at this time.

The 25th Brigade turned over its positions to the 28th Commonwealth Brigade at the end of June. During the next six weeks, while in divisional reserve, the Canadians worked on the Wyoming and Kansas defences and underwent refresher training. Their tanks had a busy time firing on drifting debris and floating mines on the swollen Imjin, in an attempt to protect "Teal" and "Pintail" bridges against damage. Unfortunately the former was washed out; but by mid September, when the flood had abated, "Pintail" bridge still stood and "Teal" was being restored.