Canada's Army in Korea

Canada's Army in Korea Preface The First Canadians in Korea Background of the Conflict Formation of the CASF The Fighting in 1950 Canadian Troops in Action Political Aspects The Patricias at Kapyong Training at Fort Lewis The 25th Brigade Goes In Early RCN Operations The 25th Brigade in Action, 1951 The 2nd RCR at Chail-li Political Developments During June 1951 Canadian Operations During June and July Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division Across the Imjin The "Rotation" of Canadian Troops Enemy Attacks During November The Political Front, July-December 1951 Holding the Line, 1951-1953 The First General Rotation Patrols Against the Boot and Hill 113 Canadian Troops on Koje Island The RCR on Hill 355 The Patricias' Second Rotation Winter on the Hook Korean Personnel with the Canadian Forces The Second General Rotation The End of the Fighting The Attack on the 3rd RCR Political Developments, 1952-53 Administration Behind the Canadian Brigade, Juny 1951-July 1953 Supporting Arms Air Support and Supply The RCN in Korean Waters, May 1951-July 1953 The Toll of the War Conclusion Main Provisions of the Armistice Agreement The Canadians After the Armistice Canadian Troops Withdraw Korea in Retrospect Books and Articles for Further Reading Abbreviations

[edit] Political Aspects

The Chinese intervention of late October had two main political consequences. One was a series of U.N. attempts to negotiate with the Communist Chinese Government for the peaceful withdrawal of its forces from Korea. The other was the naming of Red China as an aggressor, which implied a reliance mainly on military means to achieve a settlement. Canada and India were among those nations which supported the former policy, and both were represented on a Cease Fire Committee approved by the General Assembly on 14 December 1950. The initial efforts of this Committee to reach an understanding with Peiping appeared to get nowhere. The United States then pressed its case for naming China an aggressor. A resolution to this effect, amended in such a way as not to close the door to further negotiation, was passed on 1 February 1951.

The Communist bloc within and outside the United Nations attempted to centre all discussion on alleged American aggression in Formosa. Peiping, moreover, regarded (or professed to regard) the U.N. action in Korea as a case of aggression by the United States. The result was much debating at cross purposes, which offered little prospect of an early peaceful settlement. As his forces again drew up to the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur strongly and openly favoured pushing for a complete military victory in Korea and, in doing so, extending the conflict across the Manchurian border. An alternative to this policy, and one which enjoyed general support both among the United Nations and within the United States, was military stabilization coupled with further negotiation. Whatever else might be said concerning either view, the latter prevailed. On 11 April Mr. Truman announced that MacArthur had been relieved of his commands.

General MacArthur was succeeded by Lieut.-General Matthew B. Ridgway, then commanding the Eighth Army, and Ridgway by Major-General James A. Van Fleet. The previous Army Commander, General Walker, had been killed in a road accident shortly before Christmas.