Canada's Army in Korea

Canada's Army in Korea Preface The First Canadians in Korea Background of the Conflict Formation of the CASF The Fighting in 1950 Canadian Troops in Action Political Aspects The Patricias at Kapyong Training at Fort Lewis The 25th Brigade Goes In Early RCN Operations The 25th Brigade in Action, 1951 The 2nd RCR at Chail-li Political Developments During June 1951 Canadian Operations During June and July Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division Across the Imjin The "Rotation" of Canadian Troops Enemy Attacks During November The Political Front, July-December 1951 Holding the Line, 1951-1953 The First General Rotation Patrols Against the Boot and Hill 113 Canadian Troops on Koje Island The RCR on Hill 355 The Patricias' Second Rotation Winter on the Hook Korean Personnel with the Canadian Forces The Second General Rotation The End of the Fighting The Attack on the 3rd RCR Political Developments, 1952-53 Administration Behind the Canadian Brigade, Juny 1951-July 1953 Supporting Arms Air Support and Supply The RCN in Korean Waters, May 1951-July 1953 The Toll of the War Conclusion Main Provisions of the Armistice Agreement The Canadians After the Armistice Canadian Troops Withdraw Korea in Retrospect Books and Articles for Further Reading Abbreviations

[edit] Political Developments, 1952-53

On 16 February 1952 the cease-fire negotiators at Panmunjom had agreed that:

within three (3) months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference ...of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.*

But the delegates were again in deadlock with respect to concrete arrangements for a cease-fire and for the supervision of an armistice, while sub-delegates were wrestling vainly with the question of the post-war disposal of war prisoners.

• Admiral Joy's team stressed that "foreign" forces meant non-Korean, and that "etc." did not include matters outside Korea.

By the end of April the U.N. forces were holding over 120,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners, and the Communists about 12,000 U.N. soldiers; only about two-thirds of the Communist prisoners wished to return to their homelands on release, as against all but a few hundred of the South Korean and other U.N. prisoners. The United Nations objected to a compulsory repatriation of prisoners, while the enemy insisted that all captives be returned whether they wished to be or not. The Reds, claiming their stand to be in line with the Geneva Convention of 1949, cited a clause which had been designed simply to ensure against forcible retention; but their real motive appears to have been to deny deserters or would-be deserters any hope of escape from Communism.

Between December 1951 and October 1952 the fate of war prisoners was the subject of bitter and fruitless debate, and on 8 October the U.N. Command called an indefinite recess in all armistice negotiations. But only two weeks later, the question was raised again in the seventh session of the U.N. General Assembly. Several resolutions, counter-resolutions and amendments were introduced and discussed before the end of November; but the only significant development was a proposal which the Indian delegation advanced, and which the Assembly adopted on 3 December over the objections of the Soviet bloc. It provided for a neutral commission to which all prisoners would be turned over. The commission would repatriate all willing prisoners, but would not use force either to carry out or to prevent such return; the disposal of unwilling prisoners would be referred to a political conference; and if after a certain time this conference had failed to solve the problem, "the responsibility for their care and maintenance and for their subsequent disposition shall be transferred to the United Nations, which in all matters relating to them shall act strictly in accordance with international law". Communist China and North Korea, whose foreign ministers received the text of the resolution, rejected these proposals; consequently no immediate settlement resulted. This resolution had, however, demonstrated the solidarity of the non-Communist members, and was to serve as the basis of the agreement that eventually was reached.

Towards the end of February 1953 General Ridgway's successor as U.N. Supreme Commander, General Mark W. Clark, wrote the Chinese and North Korean commanders that he was willing to begin an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners who were fit to travel, and who wished to be repatriated during hostilities. He received a favourable reply within a month, and with it the suggestion that full armistice discussions be resumed. The exchange was formally agreed upon at Panmunjom on 11 April, and was carried out during the next three weeks. (Among the prisoners returned were two Canadians.) Meanwhile the Foreign Minister of Communist China, Mr. Chou En-lai, had proposed that "both parties to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state ..." and that while in neutral custody prisoners should be visited by explanation teams of their own nationality. This amounted to a qualified acceptance of the General Assembly's resolution of December 1952. That member which had introduced the resolution became the "neutral" state in question. It is true that India had contributed a medical unit to the U.N. forces, but she was an Asiatic power which had consistently remained aloof from American and Soviet influences alike.

The prospect of an early truce, far from slackening military operations, seemed to provoke some of the most bitter fighting of the war. In May the Turkish Brigade, under command of the 25th U.S. Infantry Division (which had relieved the Marines to the left of the Commonwealth sector), repulsed a strong Chinese thrust. Towards the end of the month the enemy again attacked the 29th British Brigade on the Hook, and was beaten off with losses estimated at over a thousand. In mid-July he mounted a series of attacks against the 1st ROK Division, north-east of Hill 355; these were broken up with the assistance of the 81st Field Regiment RCA. Among the heaviest and the very last actions of the campaign were two involving the Marine Division, which had returned to the area south-west of the Hook. Aided by the 2nd Royal Australian Regiment and Commonwealth artillery and tanks, the Americans held their ground. More effective attacks had come in the Eighth Army's central sector, principally against South Korean formations, reducing the Kum-song salient. Apparently the main reason behind the enemy's efforts here was that the Republic of Korea still opposed an armistice which would leave the peninsula divided.

On 18 June, without consulting the U.N. authorities, President Rhee had ordered the release of over 25,000 North Korean prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated. In reply to a Communist protest against this dramatic but untimely move, General Clark pointed out that the proposed armistice was a military matter, and the while the U.N. Command was in control of the ROK Army it had no authority over the Korean Government. At the same time a personal representative of the President of the United States persuaded Mr. Rhee to refrain from further acts which might upset the truce talks, and the U.N. Commander was then able to give appropriate assurances to the Communist negotiators. These assurances were accepted on 19 July, and the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom eight days later.

The signing preceded by twelve hours the actual cease-fire, which took effect at 10:00 p.m. on the 27th; thus ended three years and one month of fighting. Millions of Korean civilians had been made homeless and many thousands of others killed or injured. The Communist Chinese forces had suffered an estimated 967,000 battle casualties, the North Koreans 624,000. U.N. (including South Korean) battle casualties numbered about 490,000.

In Washington, on the day following the cease-fire, representatives of those U.N. countries whose armed forces had fought in Korea signed the following declaration:

We...support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

We shall support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea...and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.