Canada's Army in Korea

Canada's Army in Korea Preface The First Canadians in Korea Background of the Conflict Formation of the CASF The Fighting in 1950 Canadian Troops in Action Political Aspects The Patricias at Kapyong Training at Fort Lewis The 25th Brigade Goes In Early RCN Operations The 25th Brigade in Action, 1951 The 2nd RCR at Chail-li Political Developments During June 1951 Canadian Operations During June and July Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division Across the Imjin The "Rotation" of Canadian Troops Enemy Attacks During November The Political Front, July-December 1951 Holding the Line, 1951-1953 The First General Rotation Patrols Against the Boot and Hill 113 Canadian Troops on Koje Island The RCR on Hill 355 The Patricias' Second Rotation Winter on the Hook Korean Personnel with the Canadian Forces The Second General Rotation The End of the Fighting The Attack on the 3rd RCR Political Developments, 1952-53 Administration Behind the Canadian Brigade, Juny 1951-July 1953 Supporting Arms Air Support and Supply The RCN in Korean Waters, May 1951-July 1953 The Toll of the War Conclusion Main Provisions of the Armistice Agreement The Canadians After the Armistice Canadian Troops Withdraw Korea in Retrospect Books and Articles for Further Reading Abbreviations

[edit] Supporting Arms

The following British and Canadian armoured units fought in Korea:

• 8th Royal Irish Hussars (to December 1951)
• 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards (December 1951 to December 1952)
• 1st Royal Tank Regiment (from December 1952)
• "C" Squadron 7th Royal Tank Regiment (to October 1951)
• "C" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse (to June 1952)
• "B" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse (June 1952-May 1953)
• "A" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse (from May 1953).

The Korean terrain, with its rugged hills and boggy flats, did not favour the extensive or most advantageous use of tanks. The only exception which "C" Squadron of the Strathconas found was the Chorwon plain. Here it gave highly effective support to patrols, using an artillery technique for indirect firing: an observation officer with forward infantry elements. The same technique was employed in the limited advances beyond the Imjin in September and October 1951. During the static phase of the war, the tanks, sited unconventionally on the hilltops, sniped at enemy positions and covered the movements of our patrols. Attached to each Canadian battalion was a tank liaison officer who was empowered to order fire at his own discretion; thus the armour was in a position to engage targets with direct fire ahead of other supporting arms. When the Chinese attacked Hill 355 in October 1952, tanks of the Strathconas' "B" Squadron were the first support elements to fire in retaliation. Ten of that squadron's tanks assisted in repulsing the attack on the 3rd RCR in May 1953.

The Korean campaign has been aptly described as a "gunner's war". Between the inception of the Commonwealth Division and the end of the fighting in 1953, the divisional artillery included the following field regiments:

• 2nd Regiment RCHA (to May 1952)
• 1st Regiment RCHA (May 1952 to April 1953)
• 81st Field Regiment RCA* (from April 1953)
  • This unit was redesignated 4th Regiment RCHA, with effect

from 16 October 1953.

• 16th Field Regiment RNZA
• 45th Field Regiment RA (to November 1951)
• 14th Field Regiment RA (November 1951 to December 1952)
• 20th Field Regiment RA (from December 1952)

None of these units contained a mortar element; instead, the divisional artillery at first had a number of independent mortar batteries and troops. The winter of 1951-52 saw these and a small light anti-aircraft element succeeded by the 61st Light Regiment RA, of which the 42nd Light Battery (mortars) was allotted to the Canadian Brigade. In March 1953 the Division acquired a British medium battery from Hong Kong. Successive Canadian field regiments normally served in direct support of the 25th Brigade, the New Zealand gunners being associated with the 28th Brigade and the British with the 29th. From the end of January 1953 to the first week of April, while the Division as a whole was in reserve, the 1st Regiment RCHA supported the 38th U.S. Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division. No. 1903 Air OP Flight RAF, attached to the divisional artillery, included Canadian and Australian army pilots. Throughout the campaign, air and ground observers alike directed artillery fire on enemy forming-up places with such effect that many a Chinese attack failed to develop; and those few which achieved some initial success owed their final failure largely to the Commonwealth gunners. In the Hook engagement of May 1953-his last strong attack on a Commonwealth position-the enemy fired some 11,000 shells. The divisional artillery replied with over 32,000 and the heavy artillery of the 1st U.S. Corps with a further 6000.

Engineer units of the Commonwealth Division were as follows:

• 28th Field Engineer Regiment:
• 12th Field Squadron RE
• 55th Field Squadron RE
• 57th Independent Field Squadron RCE (to May 1952)
• 23rd Field Squadron RCE (May 1952 to March 1953)
• 59th Independent Field Squadron RCE (from March 1953)
• 64th Field Park Squadron RE.

The 12th Field Squadron included a section of New Zealanders and an Australian officer. In the Field Park Squadron were some 30 all ranks of the RCE - the field park element of an independent field squadron initially designed to support a brigade group. The allotment of Korean labour to the divisional engineers varied between 1000 and 2000 men; and further assistance, including the support of a battalion of the 1st Corps engineers, was available to the Division from American sources. Of the many, varied tasks that faced the Commonwealth sappers, by far the largest was road work - 70 per cent of the engineer effort was devoted to constructing enough roads to bear the necessary traffic, and to keeping them passable under every adverse condition of weather and ground. Another major engineering task was mine laying. Tunnelling, such as was carried out on the Hook, was but one of many extraordinary requirements which the sappers had to meet. The 1st Commonwealth Division Signal Regiment was all British except for the Canadian and New Zealand artillery signals and the signal component of the Canadian Brigade. (The 25th Brigade Signal Squadron had become "J" Troop of the divisional signals.) The abnormal distances between units and the nature of the intervening ground, with their limiting effect on wireless communications, greatly increased the amount of line to be laid and maintained. Road conditions and danger from guerillas dictated that dispatch riders should use jeeps rather than motorcycles, and should travel in pairs. In short, the signals organization faced much the same problems as did all arms and services of the Division, and on its efficient functioning depended the success of the overall effort.

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