Canada's Army in Korea

Canada's Army in Korea Preface The First Canadians in Korea Background of the Conflict Formation of the CASF The Fighting in 1950 Canadian Troops in Action Political Aspects The Patricias at Kapyong Training at Fort Lewis The 25th Brigade Goes In Early RCN Operations The 25th Brigade in Action, 1951 The 2nd RCR at Chail-li Political Developments During June 1951 Canadian Operations During June and July Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division Across the Imjin The "Rotation" of Canadian Troops Enemy Attacks During November The Political Front, July-December 1951 Holding the Line, 1951-1953 The First General Rotation Patrols Against the Boot and Hill 113 Canadian Troops on Koje Island The RCR on Hill 355 The Patricias' Second Rotation Winter on the Hook Korean Personnel with the Canadian Forces The Second General Rotation The End of the Fighting The Attack on the 3rd RCR Political Developments, 1952-53 Administration Behind the Canadian Brigade, Juny 1951-July 1953 Supporting Arms Air Support and Supply The RCN in Korean Waters, May 1951-July 1953 The Toll of the War Conclusion Main Provisions of the Armistice Agreement The Canadians After the Armistice Canadian Troops Withdraw Korea in Retrospect Books and Articles for Further Reading Abbreviations

[edit] The Attack on the 3rd RCR

The period of front-line duty which the 1st Commonwealth Division began in April 1953 was its last of the Korean war. Although the closing months of the campaign were far from quiet, only one strong attack came against the 25th Canadian Brigade. On the night of 19-20 April the 3rd Royal Canadian Regiment, entering the line for the first time, relieved the homeward bound 1st Royal 22e R?giment on the more southerly of the two Hills 187. To the left of this position, guarding the Yongdong feature and the Hook, was the 29th British Brigade. On the right was the 3rd Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and to its right the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. The boundary between the 25th and the 28th Brigade lay opposite the right flank of the Chinese First Army and the left of the 46th Army.

The RCR position resembled the palm of a great, gnarled hand. Hill 187 itself represented the base of the thumb, from which three finger-like ridges ran westward, pointing towards the lower reaches of the Nabu-ri stream. The CO, Lieut.-Colonel K. L. Campbell, assigned "A" Company to 187 and "C" to the first "finger"; he placed "B" Company on the second and third fingers and "D" as at the base of a fourth. "C", his right forward company, had two platoons on Point 97 and its headquarters and the other platoon on Point 123. The battalion's defences had not suffered as badly either from enemy shelling or from the weather as had those of Hill 355 in the autumn of 1952, nor were they as well developed as the Hook position; they were representative of the divisional front in general.

In accordance with divisional policy, Colonel Campbell ordered that the wire be thickened, the trenches deepened and gaps in the system filled, and the fire bays and bunkers reinforced - especially in the case of "C" Company, whose position was a favourite target of the Chinese artillery and mortars. Enemy patrols, meanwhile, were treating No Man's Land almost as though it were their property, an impression which Commonwealth commanders resolved to correct by increasing the number of their own patrols. A patrol of "A" Company of the RCR, in fact, was out when the enemy struck. That was on the evening of 2 May.

The amount of hostile shelling and probing pointed to an attack in near future. There was little indication, however, that the Chinese had chosen this particular time for it-no sharp increase in his patrol activity, no change in his shelling habits. For the RCR as a whole, 2 May was a quiet day; for "C" Company, as usual, it was one of fairly heavy shelling and mortaring. One man was killed in the afternoon when a platoon OP on Hill 97 received a direct hit, and three others were wounded early in the evening. The fighting strength of the company at this time was about 130, including 22 Katcom soldiers. Attached were some 60 members of the Korean Service Corps, of whom two-thirds were employed at digging and the remainder as porters. The "A" Company patrol, 16 strong, passed through "C" at 8:30 p.m. and took up a position north of Point 97 and east of where the village of Chinchon had stood.* Its task was to ambush any enemy patrols that might come up the valley and attempt to penetrate between the RCR and the Patricias. No. 8 Platoon of "C" Company was prepared to reinforce it should the need arise; and the whole company was still standing to, for the moon had not yet come up. At about half-past ten the patrol came under attack by more than 60 Chinese, operating in three groups. The patrol leader was killed and half his men either killed or captured. Colonel Campbell ordered the remainder to withdraw and No. 8 Platoon to engage the enemy who were attempting to cut them off. The platoon commander took one of his sections forward, and soon this group also found itself in a losing fight.

At midnight, hours before the last remnants of these two parties had made their way back, the Chinese artillery put down a heavy concentration on Point 97. Then the enemy infantry assaulted. No. 7 Platoon's commander, 2nd Lieut. E. H. Hollyer, called for artillery fire right on his own position, catching not only the first wave of the attackers but a follow up force as well. Throughout the action he received the closest co-operation from Lieut. L. G. Cot? (attached to the battalion from the RC Signals), who maintained communications under these extremely difficult and dangerous conditions. The other platoon on Point 97 came under attack as well, but held its ground with its own weapons. Threatened attacks on "A" and "B" Companies and on the Patricias were broken up by our supporting arms. To some 2000 shells which the enemy had fired, the divisional artillery replied fourfold; the 81st Canadian Field Regiment alone fired 4300 rounds. The RCR was also assisted by the PPCLI mortars and machine-guns, and by part of the 1st Corps artillery.

(A patrol of the 1st RCR had completely destroyed this village in May 1952)

Shortly after half-past one the Chinese began to retire from Point 97, and the Commonwealth artillery, at Lieut. Hollyer's request, lifted its fire so as to harass the withdrawal. A few hours afterwards Colonel Campbell took "C" Company out of the battalion area for a period of rest and refitting. Its relief was "D" Company, whose former position was now occupied by a company of the recently arrived 3rd Royal 22e. The night's action, a raid in battalion strength, had cost the enemy more than 80 fatal casualties. The RCR's losses were 25 killed, 28 wounded and seven taken prisoner, exclusive of 35 Katcom and KSC casualties. Chinese artillery fire had also killed two Patricias and two Canadian gunners, and wounded seven Patricias. There is no doubt that losses would have been heavier but for body armour, which, since its experimental use by patrols in the summer of 1952, had become standard equipment for forward troops of the Commonwealth Division.

Over the remaining 12 weeks of the war, enemy shelling and patrol contacts resulted in a further 104 Canadian casualties, of which 17 were fatal. The Canadian Army's final total was 1543 - 309 killed, 1101 wounded and 32 prisoners of war, plus 101 "battle injuries". There were 90 deaths other than in battle.