Canada's Army in Korea

Canada's Army in Korea Preface The First Canadians in Korea Background of the Conflict Formation of the CASF The Fighting in 1950 Canadian Troops in Action Political Aspects The Patricias at Kapyong Training at Fort Lewis The 25th Brigade Goes In Early RCN Operations The 25th Brigade in Action, 1951 The 2nd RCR at Chail-li Political Developments During June 1951 Canadian Operations During June and July Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division Across the Imjin The "Rotation" of Canadian Troops Enemy Attacks During November The Political Front, July-December 1951 Holding the Line, 1951-1953 The First General Rotation Patrols Against the Boot and Hill 113 Canadian Troops on Koje Island The RCR on Hill 355 The Patricias' Second Rotation Winter on the Hook Korean Personnel with the Canadian Forces The Second General Rotation The End of the Fighting The Attack on the 3rd RCR Political Developments, 1952-53 Administration Behind the Canadian Brigade, Juny 1951-July 1953 Supporting Arms Air Support and Supply The RCN in Korean Waters, May 1951-July 1953 The Toll of the War Conclusion Main Provisions of the Armistice Agreement The Canadians After the Armistice Canadian Troops Withdraw Korea in Retrospect Books and Articles for Further Reading Abbreviations

[edit] The Political Front, July-December 1951=

The first meeting of official representatives of the opposing commanders had taken place at Kaesong on 10 July. The U.N. delegation (headed by Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN) consisted of one South Korean and four U.S. officers, the Communist delegation of two North Korean and two Chinese officers. In his opening statement, Admiral Joy summed up the purpose of the talks as "the cessation of hostilities in Korea, under conditions which will ensure against their resumption". The U.N. delegation, he continued, would not discuss political or economic matters of any kind, or military matters not related to Korea. Most of July was devoted to the preparation of an agenda to provide a basis for detailed discussions.

By the sixth meeting only one major issue appeared to be obstructing these talks: the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. This point, which had been raised by the Communist delegation, was a political matter and therefore outside the scope of immediate negotiations; and moreover, such a step would violate the U.N. principle that South Korea must be protected against further aggression. The basic conditions for an armistice, the American Secretary of Defence stated, were:

...agreement upon a military line which will be defensible in the event of any renewal of hostilities ...agreement not to reinforce the troops now in Korea ...provision for adequate supervision and actual inspection by representatives of both sides to ensure against any preparations for a surprise attack and as a continuing evidence of good faith ...[and] a satisfactory agreement regarding prisoners of war....

The Communists modified their demand for the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, suggesting instead the established of a demilitarized zone on either side of the demarcation line. The U.N. delegation agreed, and the agenda was completed on 26 July. The next point of difference was whether the proposed demarcation line should be on the 38th Parallel or along the existing front, the Communists insisting on the former. Disagreement on this question was aggravated by charges and counter-charges of violating the neutrality of Kaesong itself, each side accusing the other of lack of good faith, slander and deliberate sabotage. Twice during August the Communists suspended negotiations; the second break-off was to last for two months. Panmunjom, six miles south of Kaesong, was the site of subsequent truce talks.

On 25 October the Communists had dropped their insistence that the 38th Parallel should serve as a demarcation line. The line which sub-delegations then agreed on closely followed with the existing front, passing slightly north of Munsan and Chorwon and through Kumsong, Mundung and Kosong; and the delegations themselves adopted this proposal on 27 November. Should an armistice agreement follow within 30 days, the line was to remain the same, regardless of any changes in the battle-line - otherwise a new demarcation line would have to be drawn. Although within the Commonwealth Division it was understood that the opposing forces had agreed to refrain from offensive operations during the period for which the demarcation line as described was valid, the enemy continued to shell and mortar our positions and to send out patrols. Our artillery was soon authorized to resume its normal tasks, and the restrictions affecting the infantry were gradually lifted. On the night of 10-11 December a company of the Patricias raided Hill 227 and the RCR despatched a fighting patrol to Hill 166. Both groups reached their objectives, inflicted casualties on the enemy, and returned with useful information concerning the Chinese defences. The period for which the demarcation line was to remain in effect passed without an armistice agreement being reached. By this time the negotiators at Panmunjom had begun to consider a question which was to prove even more troublesome: the exchange of prisoners of war. That subject merits separate treatment in a later chapter.